In this paper, we examine the efficacy of grandfathering relative to other rights allocation mechanisms, such as auctions. Our basic proposition is that grandfathering increases dynamic efficiency compared to the alternatives. It is efficient to grant rights to incumbents because they can draw upon innate abilities and historical, fishery-specific learning, avoiding the transaction costs of subsequent reallocation should the rights be granted to different parties. Moreover, these attributes provide differential productive advantages for increasing rents that are not easily recognized, valued, monitored, or transferable to outsiders. We provide supportive evidence and call for more research on allocation.
I. Introduction
The recognition that weak property rights have been the major cause of the world-wide depletion in ocean fish stocks has led to the adoption of rights-based management (RBM) in fisheries , Shotton 2000 , Beddington et al. 2007 ). Although the potential for RBM to improve fisheries is widely accepted, the mechanisms for allocating rights are controversial. By far the most common way of assigning rights has been to grant them on the basis of historical participation in the fishery (National Research Council 1999 , Shotton 2000 , Arnason 2002 , FAO 2004 ).
This practice is termed grandfathering or first possession (Epstein 1979 , Rose 1985 , Lueck 1995 .
Some economists, however, favor auctions over grandfathering. They contend that auctions allocate rights to users who place the highest value on the rights; that they transfer resource rents to the state (which can then distribute them beneficially to the polity); and that efficiency in resource use is invariant to the rights distribution mechanism (see Grafton 1995 , Morgan 1995 , Bromley 2009 ).
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In this paper, we examine the efficacy of grandfathering relative to other rights allocation mechanisms. Our basic proposition is that grandfathering increases dynamic efficiency compared to the alternatives. It is efficient to grant rights to incumbents because they can draw upon innate abilities and historical, fisheryspecific learning, avoiding the transaction costs of subsequent reallocation should the rights be granted to different parties. Moreover, these attributes provide differential 1 Similar views have been expressed in other natural resource uses. For example, Parry et al. (1999) and Goulder et al. (2010) endorse auctioning allocations in a cap and trade program rather than grandfathering or free distribution because of the indirect advantages of using the funds to lower more distortive taxes.
productive advantages for increasing rents that are not easily recognized, valued, monitored, or transferable to outsiders. 2 Existing fishers expand rents in a variety of ways: by productive investments in fish stocks and ocean habitat; by finding new fishing opportunities; by implementing improved production practices; by developing new products and marketing processes; and by producing public (or club) goods through local collective action. These advances, however, do not happen automatically. The insights underlying innovation often are based on long-standing experience in the fishery, and once conceptualized they are encouraged through expected returns on investments undertaken relative to the cost of capital. Accordingly, grandfathering promotes dynamic efficiency in the fishery by recognizing the idiosyncratic advantages of incumbents for specialized investment; by retaining rents in the industry and thereby lowering the cost of capital; and by implicitly endorsing existing and often informal property rights, motivating investment in the fishery.
Because natural resource rents constitute a significant part of the social wealth of many nations (World Bank 2006, 4), a major task of economic policy is to promote expansion of such rents. If resource rents were simply a given quantity and required no additional investment, the allocation of property rights would not matter. The government could either give them, away allowing those fortunate enough to receive access to capture the rents, or it could auction them to the highest bidder, thus allowing the polity to collect the rents. 2 The complexities of negotiations among entrepreneurs, investors, and ultimately larger firms, as well as for innovation within and across firms of various sizes are stressed by Kaplan & Strömberg (2001) , Teece (1996) , Acs and Audretsch (1987) , and Williamson (1975) . 3 Auctions transfer rents to the auctioneer, usually the state, in a similar way to Pigouvian taxes that extract resource rents (Pigou 1920 , Baumol 1972 . Although Pigouvian taxes are seldom used, relative tax rates across jurisdictions are important determinants of resource flows and investments. For a discussion of this, see Findlay (1978, 13) and Calomiris & Hubbard (1995) . To the extent that auctions transfer rents, it is likely that they will have similar negative consequences for investment.
In this case, privatization alone via RBM would be sufficient to reduce the losses of open access and/or ineffective government regulation. But we argue that rent expansion arises from more than privatization and that the allocation rule matters because its form can influence the path of subsequent investment. Auctions, for example, can fully or partially expropriate rents and in so doing both reduce incentives for innovative investment and the ability of firms to finance it. Although auctions may increase short-run government revenue and maximize the share of initial resource rents going to the state, the productive ventures required to expand future rents are discouraged by such transfers.
To develop these arguments, we describe the movement toward RBM, discuss various allocation methods, elaborate on the role of rents for dynamic efficiency, develop formal arguments of the economic advantages of grandfathering relative to auctions, and provide empirical evidence supportive of our arguments.
We recognize that because auctions in fisheries have been rare, we do not have data to compare investment patterns across the two regimes, which could provide a test of our hypothesis. As an alternative, we point to (i) examples where rents have been expanded in fisheries by incumbents; (ii) to data on the lack of diversification by fishing firms that underscores the importance of rent retention by them for reducing risk and thereby lowering the cost of capital; and (iii) to experiences in other industries where rents play an important role in investment patterns. We conclude by speculating as to whether the advantages of grandfathering rights in fisheries holds for other resources and calling for increased research on the long-term effects of property rights distribution mechanisms.
The latter is an important point because the economics of rights allocation has not received due attention in the literature, perhaps for the reasons noted above. Yet, research on this issue is critical given the general move toward RBM.
In our discussion, we emphasize that the use of grandfathering does not preclude entry by outsiders with superior financial assets. We argue, however, that such entry is less likely to be successful in fisheries than perhaps other industries, because of the importance of intrinsic fishing abilities, localized knowledge, and the related learning by doing among incumbents. None of these attributes is easily assessed, secured, or monitored by others outside the industry. Hence, if these factors are instrumental for envisioning and implementing investment opportunities, then incumbents will have a competitive advantage in wealth-enhancement. Further, although outsiders could presumably secure rights to the fishery through auctions and then employ incumbents to engage in dynamic investments, such employment and rent-sharing contracts are complicated to design, negotiate, monitor and enforce. 4 For all of these reasons, we argue that grandfathering is the most efficient general allocation mechanism for rights in fisheries.
II. Rights-Based Management
Fishery rents are vulnerable to dissipation under common-pool or open-access conditions through excessive short-term harvest, overinvestment in capital and labor, underinvestment in stocks, and distorted technical progress in the industry. These losses were first described by Jens Warming in 1911 (in Danish, translated by Andersen 1983 ) and Scott Gordon in 1954. As suggested by Anthony Scott (1955) , the fundamental cause of this waste is the lack of private property rights. The absence 4 The transaction cost literature emphasizes the difficulty of contracting to provide high-powered incentives and to avoid opportunism. See for example, Williamson (1985) and Kaplan & Strömberg (2001) , but the literature on contracting in settings such as these is a large one. Lueck and Allen (2002) use a similar argument to explain why family based farms have persisted in the U.S. rather than to be replaced by corporate structures with more diversified assets.
of clear property rights (informal or formal, group or individual) leads to dissipation of resource rents and prevents bargaining solutions of the type outlined by Coase (1960) . With declining catch-per-unit-of-effort and depletion of the fish stock, the opportunity for fisheries to provide a basis for long-term wealth creation is lost (World Bank & FAO 2009, xvii) .
Prescriptive regulation to control entry and production has been costly and ineffective at halting the decline in fish stocks (see, for example, Johnson & Libecap 1982 , Shotton 2000 , Beddington et al. 2007 , thus returning attention to rights-based management (see Neher et al. 1989 , Shotton 2000 , Hannesson 2004 , Stavins 2007 , Beddington et al. 2007 . 5 For fisheries, individual transferable quotas (ITQs) were first suggested by Francis Christy in 1973 as a means of incorporating property rights.
Under this arrangement, the total allowable catch (TAC) is set by regulators and catch shares are assigned to fishers as a property right to the flow of harvest. 6 Other rightsbased mechanisms include territorial user rights (TURFs), sole ownership, and community rights (Arnason 2007b ).
RBM establishes property rights and thereby creates incentives and institutional mechanisms for reducing the number of fishers and vessels; for increasing output-per-unit-of-effort; for improving access to capital markets; for trading rights to the most productive fishers; for encouraging investment in fish stocks and habitat; and for engaging in Coasean bargaining to reduce rent dissipation. 7 To be 5 The literature on fishery regulation is very large and we cannot be inclusive. Some relevant papers are those by Crutchfield (1961) , Brown (1974) , Anderson (1985) , Homans & Wilen (1997), and Wilen (2000) . 6 The literature on design and implementation of ITQs is also large. For a discussion, see Grafton (1996) . Arnason (2009) most effective, the rights must be permanent, secure, exclusive, and tradable (Scott 1989 , Arnason 2007b A. Political allocation refers to the direct assignment of property rights by government officials. This mechanism has a clear potential for rent seeking (Kruger 1975 , Buchanan et al. 1980 . 9 It has rarely been used in fisheries perhaps because of the widespread respect for first possession, the specific information and human capital required for entry into the industry, and because RBM typically has been implemented when fish stocks have been dangerously depleted, reducing available rents and their value as political rewards (Hannesson 2004, 111; Libecap 2008 The resource still migrates to high-valued users and rents remain in the fishery.
Nonetheless, uniform allocation such as lottery distribution has not, to our knowledge, been used for fisheries RBM.
C. First possession or grandfathering assigns ownership to existing fishers based on historical catch, capital investment, or some combination of the two. First possession rules recognize current parties, who have experience in exploiting the resource. As noted above, it is the most common allocation mechanism for fisheries (Shotton 2000 , Hatcher et al. 2001 , Arnason 2002 , Libecap 2007 ).
11 9 Competition for resource rents in the presence of weak institutions results in rent dissipation and the so-called resource curse. See Sachs &Warner (2001) and Torvik (2002) . 10 Namibia and South Africa are examples of countries where political allocation of fishing rights has been used. 11 Equity or fairness issues are major arguments raised against first possession as part of the privatization of fisheries (Bromley 2009 , McCay 2010 . McCay (2010) is concerned about D. Auctions allocate rights to the highest bidder with the revenues going to the seller, generally the state. 12 Therefore, not surprisingly, they tend to be favored by governments (Milgrom 2004) . Auctions are commonly used to grant use rights for previously unexploited resources for which the state may have clear ownership, such as timber concessions, oil and gas leases, and the division of the electro-magnetic spectrum. Auctions have also been adopted for allocating emissions permits under cap-and-trade policies for various types of air pollution control and proposed in new programs for greenhouse gas regulation. 13 In fisheries, they have rarely been used.
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IV. Resource Rents from RBM
Economic rents incorporate several distinguishable components. One is Ricardian or resource rent, generated by an asset that is naturally relatively fixed in supply, such as land (Ricardo 1821, 34−5, 44) . This is the surplus value above costs and normal returns not necessary for production from the asset. Another is Schumpeterian rent, generated when the value of the asset is increased due to innovative activities (Schumpeter 1950) . A third concept is inframarginal resource rent generated by individuals or firms characterized by greater skill, human capital, and/or risk tolerance in production using the asset. This rent is earned even in openaccess settings where only the marginal actors earn zero rents (Johnson & Libecap 1982 , Johnson 1995 . Individuals with more skill and enterprise are more likely to consolidation in the industry under ITQs and the gradual decline of fishing communities. She advocates community rights or common property. The conditions under which common property regimes function effectively, however, are limited as outlined by Ostrom (1990, 90) . Also, ironically, we argue that grandfathering is most likely to assist small, undiversified fishing firms and hence, reduce pressures for consolidation due to lack of access to funding. 12 The literature on the efficiency advantages of auctions is large (Vickrey 1961 , Bulow & Roberts 1989 , Dasgupta & Maskin 2000 , Milgrom 2004 , Klemperer 2004 . 13 For a discussion of the arguments, see Goulder et al. (1997) , Parry et al. (1999) , Crampton & Kerr (2002) , Parry (2008, 160−61), and Goulder et al. (2010) . 14 We are only aware of four cases of auctions being used as a primary tool to allocate ITQ rights in fisheries-in certain fisheries in Russia and Estonia in the late 1990s (Vetemaa et al. 2002 , Hønneland 2005 , in a few small fisheries for squat lobster, yellow prawn, black hack, and orange roughy in southern Chile (Pena-Torres 1997) , and in the Washington State Puget Sound geoduck fishery (Huppert 2005) . In Russia and Estonia, the outcome of these auctions was found to be unsatisfactory and they were discontinued.
invest and innovate and thereby generate additional Schumpeterian rent, an issue we emphasize below. Finally, there is monopoly rent, generated when the asset's supply is artificially reduced in order to raise profits (Tullock 1967) . Because monopoly rents are often short term and potentially competed away, they have been termed quasi rents (Klein et al.1978) .
Some discussions of rent allocation mechanisms in fisheries are restricted to a static framework and regard all rents to be Ricardian, determined solely by the value of the resource in excess of opportunity costs (Clark et al. 1989 , Morgan 1995 . With that perception, resource rents may be seen as a -fortuitous gift of nature‖ (Bromley 2009, 14) that -can either be taxed away by the government or left in the fishery to be capitalized into the value of the ITQ‖ without efficiency implications (Clark et al. 1989, 138) . Morgan (1995) presents the case for auctions of fishing rights apparently along similar lines, and Bromley goes a step further to say that -the government should tax away that excess profit and return it to the owner [the government] of the fish‖ (Bromley 2009, 15 , emphasis added).
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We take exception to the presumption that efficiency is invariant to the allocation of rights because it ignores the dynamic process whereby rents are created.
Even Ricardian rents must be discovered, and discovery requires effort. Moreover, rents can be augmented by entrepreneurship and innovation (see Schumpeter1950).
Once entrepreneurship is introduced into the production process, Ricardian and Schumpeterian rents cannot be easily separated. They become a return to discovery and exploration, research and innovation, and other investments in the fishery.
Accordingly, taxing away such rents reduces the incentives for and raises the costs of 15 Curiously, in these arguments, little attention is paid to how the rents collected by the government might be distributed. Volden & Wiseman (2007) , for example, discuss the political obstacles in the legislative process to using government funds to provide public goods, rather than rewarding special interests in the legislative process. See also Grafton et al. (2009) With RBM, if these initial returns are taxed away or if the formal rights are auctioned by the government, the incentives for and ability to finance further prospecting and productive innovation are reduced. As we shall see later, this suggests why the U.S. Mining Act of 1862 allowed prospectors to patent their mining claims for a small fee and why the American mining industry became preeminent worldwide in the 19 th century.
Grandfathering rights thus increases the incentive for discovery and investment in three ways. First, it allows for higher private returns from the generation of new and better information about the fishery, investments in human and physical capital, new marketing efforts, and actions to increase or conserve fish stocks.
Second, secure property rights to fishery rents reduce the cost of capital. Rent retention lowers risk for securing external finance and provides a source of selffinancing (Myers & Majluf 1984) . 16 The expropriation of retained earnings by any means increased firm-specific risk. This greater risk will be felt more by small undiversified firms, very common in fisheries (as we show), than by large diversified companies.
17 Evans & Jovanovic (1989) examine the role of liquidity constraints on entrepreneurial behavior and conclude that asymmetric information, moral hazard, and adverse selection increase the cost of capital to entrepreneurs in conventional capital markets. This helps explain why wealthy external parties, who might be the highest bidder in an auction, would not be as effective at increasing fishery rents as grandfathered incumbents. The highest bidder cannot purchase the knowledge imbedded in the entrepreneur, nor does the winner have a history of successful exploitation to draw upon to mold further investments.
The third dynamic effect of grandfathering rights is that it encourages fishers to undertake collective action. 18 Johnson (1995, 337) notes that a quota system -provides incentives for the industry to act collectively to lower costs and to engage in activities such as product development and fishery management that have the potential to increase quota value.‖ Pooling information on resource availability increases collective rents by reducing search costs. The negative effects on all three types of rent creation---prospecting, innovation, and collective action---are greater if there are repeated actions by government to extract the rents through new taxation or repeated auctions as new rents are generated. As fishers anticipate this, their incentives and funding abilities are reduced, and the rent-generating process is curtailed.
V. A Formal Model of Rent Retention
In this section, we formalize some of the arguments for grandfathering described above. We restrict the analysis to the impact of rent expropriation on the financial costs of investments, comparing grandfathering to a once-and-for-all auction, which is assumed to create the least distortion (Arnason 2007a ). 19 The model formalizes three propositions. First, auctions reduce the wealth of the successful bidder. Second, reduced wealth leads to higher costs of financial capital to the company. Third, higher capital costs lead to less investment and, therefore, lower resource rents in the future. plus any other net assets the company may own, say w. We represent initial wealth by:
Note that some portion of this wealth may be assumed to have resulted from time-and-place-specific investments including investments in specialized knowledge which is accumulated by the company in the course of its operations -learning by doing. In particular, (0) is specific to each company. Note that in this model the companies are not assumed to be homogeneous. Therefore, the maximum value functions are company specific and will in general differ across companies due to factors not included in x(0) and (0).
Let the auction price be A. Then, following the auction, the wealth of the company is:
Note that if the auction is truly competitive, AV(x(0),(0)) so W(1)w. Now, let us assume that perfect capital markets are accessible to this company.
In these markets, the company is faced with financial capital prices. The prices at which it can borrow depend, among other things, on the default risk associated with the company perceived by potential lenders (Merton 1974) . Clearly, ceteris paribus, this risk is a declining function of the company's wealth-higher wealth implies greater ability to pay if things go wrong and, besides, offers a wider scope of marketable collateral. Thus, other things being equal, the wealthier the company, the lower is its cost of capital.
Let the profit function (on a cash-flow basis) of the company at a point of time, t, be:
The function ( ( ), ( ))
q t x t  is the company's base profit function with q(t) denoting harvest and x(t) biomass. This function is the typical profit function in fisheries economic analysis (Clark & Munro 1975 , Anderson 1986 . Remember that since the companies are not assumed to be identical, the base profit function will differ across companies. The technical coefficient, (t), standard in dynamic production analysis, represents productivity due, inter alia, to R&D (research and development) (Solow 1957) . This coefficient shifts individual profit functions over time, just as neutral technical progress would shift the production function. Nonneutral technical impacts on the profit function are, of course, possible but add nothing material to this analysis.
It is important to note that the technical coefficient in the current context is a wider concept than in standard production theory. It represents anything that shifts the profit function, including marketing development, management improvements, and organization changes, all of which are likely to be specific to the historic use of the resource and therefore not easily transferable through market exchange.
The function ( ( ), ( )) C i t W t represents the cost of R&D with i(t) denoting investment in R&D and W(t) the company's wealth. Resource specific R&D,
especially in the form of knowledge of the location and behavior of more valuable stocks and of how capital can be combined to labor to capture that value, is imbedded in the firm, in ways that make it difficult to simply sell as part of the capitalized value of the firm. In accordance with the discussion above, we assume that both the cost and the marginal cost of R&D falls with the company's wealth, i.e., C W , C iW <0.
It is important to realize that the profit function in (1), being at least partly the result of learning by doing, is defined for a given company and differs in general across companies. It follows that mere wealth will not necessarily lead to high or even positive marginal profits of investments in R&D. This return on investments also depends on the specific economic efficiency of the company represented by its technical coefficient (t).
Note that the profit function in (1) contains two state variables, x(t) and (t)
and two control (decision) variables q(t) and i(t) influencing the evolution of the state variables over time. In order to simplify the presentation we will, in what follows, restrict our attention to the technical coefficient and its evolution in discrete time.
In discrete time, let the change in the technical coefficient be:
where the function F(i(t)) determines how investments in R&D modify the technical coefficient. Presumably, this function is increasing in investments, and we assume that this increase is diminishing with the level of investments, i.e., that the function is concave.
Write the maximum value function (present value of profits) at time zero as:
is the company's discount factor.
Consider initial time t=0. At this time, the firm is faced with deciding on investment in R&D and harvest. To focus on the investment decision, assume the path of harvests {q} is exogenous, e.g., due to a harvest quota system. Thus, the path of base profits, { ( ( ), ( )) q t x t  }, is given. At time t=0, the optimal choice of investment in R&D is given by:
By repeated substitutions into (2), we find:
For equilibrium, base profits (i.e., equilibrium harvest and biomass),  , condition (3) reduces to
( (0), (0)) ( (0))
Differentiating (3) or (4) with respect to initial wealth shows that investment in R&D increases as initial wealth increases. More precisely, from (3) we find:
On the assumptions made (C ii , C iw >0 and F ii <0), both derivatives are unequivocally positive. It immediately follows that reduced company wealth leads to less investments in R&D, and therefore less future rents in the fishery than would otherwise have been the case.
The wealth effect on investments in R&D defined by (5) and (6) operates via the cost of financial capital, i.e., the interest rate demanded by providers of finance who require a higher risk premium from less wealthy companies and vice versa. In addition to this direct effect, it will generally be the case that changes in the interest rate on external finance will affect the company's weighted cost of capital in the same direction and therefore also the discount factor used by the company to calculate the present value of profits (Ross et al. 2008 ). This further reinforces the above results.
Different companies, of course, will have different costs of capital, which will be decreasing in the wealth of the company.
In addition to differential capital costs related to initial company wealth, companies may, as has been pointed out above, have different marginal values of investment. This applies especially if the investments are resource specific or combined with specialized knowledge acquired over time through learning-by-doing, as in the case of fisheries. Firms that have a history of resource use will have accumulated wealth from these activities.
Hence an auction of rights to continue use will do more than simply redistribute the wealth away from long-time investors, but discourage such investments in the first place and reduce the net rents from rationalization. These arguments establish that extraction of rents, by auctions or other means, will reduce company wealth, increase the cost of capital, and generally reduce investment in R&D.
In addition to the effect of reduced wealth at time zero delineated in expressions (5) and (6), reduced wealth in period one and in future periods will have a similar effect. Thus, there will be a cumulative impact on investments in R&D over time, stemming from the initial extraction of rents from the industry.
Note that the marginal impact of wealth on the marginal cost of investments measured by the derivative C iw in expressions (5) and (6) Finally, as we have argued, although, in the above model, wealth unambiguously increases efficiency and investments by reducing investment costs, this does not imply that wealthy companies outside the fishing industry are (or even can be) more efficient than less wealthy companies within the fishery. The reason is that existing fishing companies may be more efficient in other aspects of the fishing operations including those dependent on their special abilities, accumulated knowledge and so on which are not represented in the adjustable efficiency parameter (0). Thus, in spite of lower wealth, their overall efficiency in the fishery may be higher. In fact, it most likely is. Why would they be in the fishery and not the other companies, if the reverse were the case?.
VI. Empirical Evidence
To test our arguments, we require comparable fisheries with different rights allocation mechanisms. As we emphasized earlier, we do not have such data to test our hypothesis, nor do proponents of auctions. There is supportive empirical evidence, however, from several fisheries and from other industries consistent with the hypothesis that follows from our model. Below we provide evidence showing that: (i) fisheries are characterized by small, specialized companies, that therefore are likely to rely upon internal financing; (ii) grandfathering facilitates the continuing existence of smaller, specialized firms in other industries that are more able to take advantage of time-and place-specific information and avoid principal-agent problems than are larger companies; 20 (iii) grandfathering encourages investment in resource discovery and innovation in extraction; and (iv) taxing rents discourages self-financing and reduces expansion, especially in newer industries in the overall economy. This is not apt to be different in fisheries.
A. Rents Finance and Reward Small, Undiversified Fishing Firms
We argue that rents increase with investments specific to fisheries, but that there are asymmetric information problems that raise the cost of obtaining capital in formal markets. Hence we would expect fisheries to be dominated by small, undiversified firms, and this is confirmed by FAO for several fisheries. According to FAO (2007) , in 2004, the total number of fishing vessels was approximately 4
million. This means that the average annual catch was just over 20 metric tons, the landed value of which was unlikely to be in excess of US$20,000 on average.
21 Table 1 shows that the number and average size of decked fishing vessels in a few fishing countries is dominated by relatively small vessels with low engine power.
The only exception is Iceland where the average vessels size is almost 200 gross tons (GT). However, the Iceland data, like those for the other countries, ignore a large number (at least 500) of undecked vessels (under 10 GT) which also participate in the fishery on an occasional basis. For the rest of the world, especially developing nations, the average size of vessels is even smaller.
22
[Insert Table 1 Here]
The Icelandic decked fishing vessels have been operating under an ITQ system since the 1980s, but have not been subject to auctions of ITQ rights or other significant forms of rent expropriation. 23 According to the Icelandic Fisheries Directorate data, permanent quota share holdings of all companies in this fishery at 21 According to the World Bank & FAO (2009, 9) , the average landed price of fish in 2004 was US$ 918 per metric ton. 22 The data in the Table do not provide direct information about the size of companies-they could conceivably operate a number of vessels. However, it is our belief that the great majority of the world's fishing companies (or concerns) hold only one vessel. Unfortunately, data on fishing companies are not routinely collected by the FAO. 23 A special fishing fee has been imposed to pay for the cost of management.
the beginning of the 2009−10 fishing season were held by 571 companies and were assigned to less than 700 vessels. Hence, the great majority of companies operated only one vessel. The average size of each company in terms of quota share was less than 0.2 percent. This corresponds to approximately US$1 million in annual turnover.
Only three companies held more than 5 percent of the total quota.
The size distribution of Icelandic companies is further described in Table 2 .
These data show that the Icelandic fishing industry is dominated by small or very small fishing companies.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The California urchin and wetfish fisheries also are characterized by small, undiversified operations. The urchin fishery is very gear-and knowledge-specific.
With a mean length of 29 feet and a mean haul capacity of 6,410 pounds, vessels on the North Coast of California make day trips and support specialized dive equipment for the collection of urchins (Scholz et al. 2010) . These vessels are too small to support line or net towing, and the human capital associated with urchin diving is not easily transferable to other fisheries. Scholz et al. (2010) also found that the fishermen obtained 100 percent of their income from fishing and 88 percent of that from the urchin fishery.
Similarly, the wetfish fishery uses specific equipment and knowledge that is not readily applied elsewhere. Wetfishing is defined by the practice of offloading the catch directly from vessel holds that are specifically designed to maintain the catch in water or ‗wet' (California Wetfish Producers Association, n.d.). It includes northern anchovy, jack mackerel, pacific mackerel, pacific sardine, market squid, various tunas (bluefin, skipjack and yellowfin) and pacific bonito (Hackett 2002) . Equipment and knowledge are relatively malleable within this list and fishermen do fish multiple species (Pomeroy et al. 2002) . The data in Table 3 reveal the relatively small size of vessels in the industry.
[Insert Table 3 here]
The evidence in Tables 1, 2 , and 3 and other anecdotal evidence showing that many fisheries are dominated by small, undiversified companies is consistent with our hypothesis that such companies generate greater dynamic resource rents. Because fisheries are characterized by pervasive asymmetric information and principal-agent problems, small specialized companies are better at internalizing the value of location-specific fishery information, at monitoring on-board processing and quality control, and at adjusting to marketing. 24 If auctions of fishing rights tilt the balance toward large diversified companies, it follows that fishery rents associated with RBM will be reduced.
B. Rents Encourage Investment, Innovation, and Collaboration in Fisheries Management
An example from the New Zealand abalone fishery illustrates investments that are rent-creating under grandfathered ITQs (Anderson & Libecap 2010) . Until RBM was implemented in 1986, abalone divers needed only a non-transferable license to harvest in what was otherwise an open-access resource. Under these conditions, they harvested as much as possible and had no incentive to invest in the stock, which was declining due to open access. 25 RBM, however, provided divers with a tradable share in the TAC established by fishery authorities. As a result, quota values rose an order 24 One indication of the asymmetric information and principal-agent problems in fisheries is the almost universal practice of remunerating fishing vessel crews with share in the value of the landed catch. As have noted earlier a similar argument is made by Allen & Lueck (2002) regarding the pervasiveness of small family farms in the United States despite apparent economies of scale in many sectors of American agriculture. 25 There was an indirect limit imposed on the abalone harvest because abalone processors faced a cap on what they would buy due to export quotas. These export quotas were neither property rights nor transferable, however, and so they did nothing to encourage divers to stop the fishery's decline or help the fishery grow.
of magnitude in just five years from approximately NZ$33,000 per metric ton in 1988
to NZ$320,000 per metric ton in 1993.
Some of this increase resulted directly from reduced access, but additional returns were due to value-enhancing investments by individual fishers. To achieve these gains, the diving business had to be redefined. Specialized dive boats with support crews for harvesting abalone were introduced. Research into other abalone fisheries, market trends, and processing operations was conducted, and abalone aquaculture was started with the development of an -aqua barrel,‖ a molded polyethylene barrel in which abalone could be planted, grown, and harvested. Another example of investment encouraged by the prospect of retaining rents is drawn from Alaska. Deacon et al. (2008 Deacon et al. ( , 2010 focus on lower-cost areas and positioning barriers or -fences‖ to channel fish so that they could be more effectively caught in nets; (iii) increasing the fishing season by 48 percent; (iv) improving fish quality; and (v) increasing the quota value and the associated rents by at least 25 percent (Deacon et al. 2010, 20−32) .
C. Rents Encourage Franchisee Investment
As we have noted above, all firms rely on internal financing, but risky new activities are particularly dependent upon in-house financing because of asymmetric information and the problem of volatile expected earnings. If franchisers tried to extract all of the Schumpeterian rents from franchisees, not only would they reduce the incentive for innovation, they would increase the cost of capital for innovation. Kaufmann & Lafontaine (1994) report that McDonald's and other franchisers do not extract all (ex ante) rents via their royalties and franchise fees.
Queues for McDonald's franchises suggest that the company is not pricing the franchises so as to capture all of the rents. Instead, the firm leaves some rents available for the initial franchisees as an incentive mechanism for good operations, development of the franchise location, and investment in the overall franchise reputation that also benefits the parent firm. Additionally, McDonald's seeks undiversified, small operators focused on the potential rents from a new franchise.
The resulting asymmetric information, however, increases downstream liquidity constraints and raise borrowing costs. Accordingly, franchisees must rely on cash flow resulting from franchise rents.
This practice applies especially for new franchises because they face greater uncertainty and more time-and place-specific information. (Calomiris & Hubbard 1995, 445) . The tax, however, changed payout strategies, reducing retained earnings at the firm level and the funds available for innovation.
Taking advantage of differential impacts of the tax and costs of external funds across the firms within their sample, Calomiris & Hubbard find that the tax reduced investment in positive net present value projects. Further, many of the most vulnerable firms with high surtax margins were concentrated in growing industries.
The negative effects of the tax were apparent enough that the legislation was repealed as an impediment to the growth of young, dynamic companies-just the kinds that were necessary for expansion and recovery from the Depression.
VII. Conclusion
The adoption of RBM in many fisheries has demonstrated how this approach can mitigate losses from open access. Despite the economic gains from RBM, the mechanism for allocating rights -usually to existing fishers -has been controversial. A major reason is distribution, that the increased value of the rights is for the most part captured by the initial recipients.
Most economists who argue against allocating fishing rights to existing fisheries through grandfathering, implicitly or explicitly assume that another allocation mechanism will have no negative efficiency consequences. This assumption seems to be based on the notion that fisheries rents (and rents from other similar resources) are naturally provided and independent of human action. Therefore, on equity grounds, rents should not accrue to existing parties, who by assumption have done little to earn them. Moreover, these rents can be captured via auctions or lump sum taxes for distribution by governments for public purposes-perhaps to reduce distortive income taxes-with no significant adverse effects.
These conclusions are not based on an extensive study of empirical evidence, but rather on a misreading of the sources of rent creation. Indeed, we contend that they neglect dynamic investment outcomes that can create and expand rents through learning-by-doing, discovery, technological advances, coordination, innovation and other investments. Moreover, our theory suggests that firms, especially smaller, undiversified companies, rely upon internal funding to take advantage of information asymmetries and to reduce principal-agent costs.
Grandfathering rights increases rents relative to auctions and other mechanisms for extracting rents from RBM in three ways: (i) it retains industry-generated rents within firms, thus providing rewards for rent-enhancing investments; (ii) it increases the ability to self-finance and lowers the cost of external financial capital by reducing risk; and (iii) it encourages collective action among rights holders that lowers information costs and reduces rent dissipation.
Taking away resource rents, particularly through auctions, which are designed to fully extract them from the fishery, inevitably raises the cost of capital and reduces discovery and innovation, particularly by small firms that may have specialized, valuable knowledge. Empirical evidence from some fisheries and other industries supports our argument that rent retention promotes discovery, innovation, collaboration, and self-finance.
We have formulated our arguments mainly in terms of the fishery. Our emphasis is on incumbent rights (de facto) holders. The arguments do not exclude processors or others who may have participated directly in the fishery and thereby, have a claim or informal right within it. The grandfathering process requires developing criteria for the assignment of formal rights, but in doing so respects existing property rights.
The same basic arguments appear to apply in other natural resource use. In all cases RBM would improve the economic efficiency of resource use, compared to the alternative, and the secure retention of the resulting rents by the rights-holders would encourage them to discover ways to take further steps for increasing the economic efficiency of the utilization.
More research is needed to test for and measure the importance of rent retention for dynamic efficiency. Until that research is forthcoming, economists do not have a reasonable basis for suggesting that the efficiency of RBM is invariant to the rights allocation and rent distribution mechanism. 
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We show that grandfathering fishing rights to local users or recognizing first possessions is more dynamically efficient than auctions of such rights. It is often argued that auctions allocate rights to the highest-valued users and thereby maximize resource rents. We counter that rents are not fixed in situ, but rather depend additionally upon the innovation, investment, and collective actions of fishers, who discover and enhance stocks and convert them into valuable goods and services. Our analysis shows how grandfathering increases rents by raising expected rates of return for investment, lowering the cost of capital, and providing incentives for collective action. 
